World War I was one of history's greatest conflicts. It has accordingly generated a vast literature, one that continues to expand with the publication of scores of new studies during this, the centenary of the war. The war was as devastating and consequential for the Middle East as anywhere else, yet the number of studies in the English language on the Great War in the Middle East still remains pitifully small. Moreover, of those works the great majority focuses on the role and operations of the British and pay only glancing attention to the Ottoman role.
In 2005, the Oxford historian of the Middle East Eugene Rogan visited the battlefield of Gallipoli. He was there not to conduct research but instead to pay respect alongside his family members to a great uncle who had fallen in combat there 90 years earlier. The visit caused Rogan to reflect on the near-total nescience of the Turkish and Arab experiences in the war. The Fall of the Ottomans represents Rogan's attempt to remedy this ignorance.
The Fall of the Ottomans provides an engaging, at times even gripping, narrative. Weighing in at 406 pages of text and six maps, the book provides a comprehensive but concise overview of the Middle East in World War I. This is no simple achievement. The war in the Middle East was complex. It found the Ottomans, assisted by their German allies, battling the armies (and navies) of the Russian, British, and French empires on multiple fronts in the Caucasus, the Dardanelles, Iran, Mesopotamia, North Africa, Yemen, 'Asir, and Palestine. And unlike in Western Europe where armies stood bogged down along essentially the same trench lines for years, in the Middle East the campaigns were fluid and unpredictable.
Throughout the book, Rogan interweaves the story of high politics and grand strategy with vignettes of individual soldiers, civilians, refugees, clergy, and missionaries. He maintains a focus on the political and military course of the war, but does not neglect to provide social, economic, and human context. He is especially good in his descriptions of British operations at Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, and in greater Syria, and in his narration of the Arab Revolt. Rogan also skillfully uses British debates over military and diplomatic strategy to reveal not just the motives and thinking behind British actions, but also how Ottoman actions profoundly affected the overall course of the war. Dismissed as inconsequential by most European observers and initially diffident about entering the war, the Ottoman Empire defied expectations by refusing to crumple under the assorted blows of the Triple Entente. Instead it persevered, forcing the Entente to divert scarce manpower and resources to the Middle East and prolonging the war by at least a year with devastating consequences that stretched well beyond the Middle East.
Rogan's synthesis within a single volume of an overview of the Ottoman experience in the Great War constitutes a major contribution. The book currently has no rival. But the specialist will not find within Fall of the Ottomans any revelations about the Ottoman war effort. Rogan, who in the past has produced research that painstakingly exploited Ottoman archival sources, opted in this book to rely largely on secondary sources and to forego Ottoman sources entirely. Only occasionally does he draw on British and (curiously) American archives, and then mainly to provide descriptive detail rather than new information or analytical insights. Archival research when performed properly and not as an exercise in window dressing, is arduous and time consuming. This is especially true in a field such as Ottoman history where knowledge even of fundamental institutions and events is often incomplete. Rogan's decision not to delve into the Ottoman archives in favor of writing a book that is timely and accessible to broader audiences is a defensible one, although greater attention to the bur-geoning Turkish-language scholarship on the war would have allowed the author to provide more depth in his analyses of Ottoman decision-making. His analysis of the Ottoman hesitance to enter the war in 1914 is on the mark, but in his assessment of the general failure of the Ottoman call to jihad he misses the fact that -paradoxically -it resonated among the Shi'a of Iraq.
World War I had an enormous impact on the Middle East, and its legacy is still raw. On no subject is this truer than on that of the destruction of the Christian communities of Eastern Anatolia. What had been a homeland for Christians for nearly two millennia ceased to be during and after the Great War. In its presentation of the destruction of the region's Armenians -and of the often overlooked Christian Assyrians -Fall of the Ottomans draws heavily on the research of Taner Akçam for narrative and the memoirs of the Armenian priest Grigoris Balakian for illustration. It rightly execrates Ottoman behavior as abominable. The book nods at the harder questions that the geopolitical nature of the Armenian Question raised, but leaves them unexplored, preferring like many works on the topic to bolster its condemnations with the assertion that Ottoman behavior was counterproductive and hence irrational. The Great Powers' arrogation in 1878 of a prerogative to intervene to protect Armenians lives and property from Kurdish and Circassian depredations set among the Kurds a pervasive fear that they might suffer the same fate as Muslims of the Ottoman Balkans and see local Christians with outside support establish a state and expel them from their own lands. Kurdish-Armenian hostility hereafter became a chronic driver of instability in the region. The calamitous Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and the Russian-imposed Armenian Reform Program of 1914 only reinforced Kurdish anxieties. During a war for the empire's existence, it was but a short step for the Unionist government in Istanbul and Kurdish tribes to escalate deportations undertaken as imminent security measures into the effective evisceration of Eastern Anatolia's Christians. Although, as Rogan notes, in the short term the deportation of the Armenian peasantry contributed to general famine and the liquidation of Armenian workers deprived the Ottoman railways of desperately needed skilled labor, in the longer term these acts made possible the Muslims' retention of sovereignty over Eastern Anatolia, something no one could have taken for granted prior to 1921, and eventually the formation of the Turkish Republic.
These criticisms, however, are quibbles. Fall of the Ottomans combines expert knowledge with fine writing and brisk narration to provide for the first time a compelling overview of the Ottoman theater in World War I. Nothing else approaches it. 
Reviewed by Edward J. Erickson
Professor Ronald Grigor Suny is a distinguished scholar and a well-published historian. He is known for his body of work specializing in Armenian history and affairs. The title of the book comes from a conversation that American ambassador Henry Morgenthau reported he had with Ottoman interior minister Talat Pasha in early August 1915 (p. 269-270) , which Suny purports to show that Talat had solved the Armenian "problem" in a particularly brutal manner. The introduction presents Professor Suny's thesis is a roundabout manner, which is to explain that the Young Turks (the alleged perpetrators of a genocide) had an "affective disposition" that "allowed them, indeed in their minds required them, to eliminate whole peoples" (p. xx). Essentially, Suny argues that the Young Turks' cognitive and emotional state demonstrated by their observed behavior and actions in 1915 proves a genocide. While this kind of argument may be suitable for forensic psychologists, historians rarely attempt it because of the dictum that correlation does not prove causation.
